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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
contract upon which services are to be rendered here pursuant to defen-
dants' order telephoned or mailed from out of State."8 5 The court con-
cluded that where "[d]efendants have deliberately opted to take
advantage of the facilities available here... ,31 it is not unreasonable
that they be held subject to New York jurisdiction.8 7
CPLR 302(a)(1): "Bootstrap" jurisdiction not permitted in enforce-
ment of foreign divorce decrees.
Where jurisdiction is predicated on CPLR 302(a)(1), the cause of
action must arise directly from the transaction of business in New
York.88 In Kochenthal v. Kochenthal,89 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, determined that the execution of a separation agreement
in New York by New York domiciliaries, "sounds in contract" and
therefore constitutes a transaction of business under CPLR 302(a)(1).
Subsequently, in Lawrenz v. Lawrenz,40 the Westchester County Family
Court held that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomi-
ciliary defendant to enforce the support provisions of a bilateral Mexi-
can divorce decree, since those provisions were incorporated into the
decree from a New York-executed separation agreement. 41
In Carmichael v. Carmichael,42 the Second Department was pre-
sented recently with the same facts as in Lawrenz. The plaintiff sought
85 70 Misc. 2d at 541, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
36 Id., 334 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
87Accord, Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 18, 256 N.E.2d
506, 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1970); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 451-52, 209 N.E.2d 68, 71-72, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13-15, cert.
denied, 382 US. 905 (1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L REv.
122, 133 (1965).
38 It is uniformly held that the cause of action must arise directly from the in-state
transaction. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 63-65 (1972) and cases therein
cited; 1 WK&M 302.06a; H. WAci-rryE., NEw YoRK PRAcrcE UNDR THE CPLR 32-34
(3d ed. 1970).
89 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1967). Accord, Zindwer v. Ehrens,
34 App. Div. 2d 906, 311 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Ist Dep't 1970) (mem.). But see Willis v. Willis,
42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (transaction of business
connotes a commercial agreement; separation agreement not encompassed by CPLR
302(a)(1)). The Willis analysis, specifically disapproved in Kochenthal, is easily refuted,
since commercial considerations can be the foundation of a separation agreement. "Ex-
tensive provisions are normally made for the division of property, complicated tax
structures are often erected, and in many cases escrow funds are created, with banks
acing as escrowees." 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 83 (1972). See also I
WK&M I 302.06a n.52a.
40 65 Misc. 2d 627, 318 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Fam. Ct. Westchester County 1971).
41 Id. at 631, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 615. The court noted that both litigants were New York
domiciliaries when the agreement was made, determined that CPLR 302 could properly
be used in family court proceedings, and decided that although the cause of action was
seemingly based on the terms of the decree, it in fact arose out of the separation agree-
ment. The complaint was dismissed, however, for defective service of process upon the
defendant.
4240 App. Div. 2d 514, 333 N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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to enforce the alimony and support provisions of a Mexican divorce
decree which had been incorporated into the decree from a New
York-executed separation agreement. The defendant, a nondomiciliary,
had been personally served in New Jersey. The court held that the
enforcement proceeding arose "directly out of the activity of the parties
in the foreign jurisdiction and only remotely out of the business trans-
acted in New York, i.e., execution of the separation agreement." 43
The Carmichael court stressed the necessity of an immediate nexus
between the business transacted in New York and the suit; its decision
represents a refusal to loosen the jurisdictional prerequisites as to mari-
tal decrees.
ARTICLE 6-JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION
AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 603: Law of the case limits the power to sever claims.
Judicial discretion in granting a severance is limited by the doc-
trine of the law of the case.44 By refusing severance a court establishes
the law of the case and thereby binds other courts of coordinate juris-
diction.45 Only an intervening new fact would permit another court
to decide otherwise.
In Dain & Dill, Inc. v. Betterton,48 the Supreme Court, Putnam
County, severed three actions previously consolidated at special term.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, stating that for
a court of coordinate jurisdiction to ignore the law of the case was
to "arrogate to [itself] powers of appellate review."'7
ARTICLE II-PooR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Departments divided as to responsibility for indigents'
publication costs.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,48 the United States Supreme Court
held that due process requires the removal of state monetary bars
43 Id., 333 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
44 "The 'law of the case' ordinarily signifies a proposition of law that has been
litigated and is deemed concluded by virtue of a previous judicial determination in the
same case .... 7 WK&M 5501.11.
46 See George W. Collins, Inc. v. Olsker-McLain Indus., Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 485,
257 N.Y.S.2d 201 (4th Dep't 1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JoHN'S L.
REv. 122, 148 (1965). "Setting aside the judicial act of one judge by another of co-ordinate
jurisdiction is avoided, wherever possible, as not conducive to the orderly administration
of justice." United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 398, 120 N.YS.2d 174, 178
(Ist Dep't 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 NX.2d 888 (1954).
46 39 App. Div. 2d 939, 33 N.Y.S.2d 237 (2d Dep't 1972) (men.).
47 Id., 332 N.Y.S.2d at 228, citing George W. Collins, Inc. v. Olsker-McLain Indus.,
Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 485, 489, 257 N.Y.S.2d 201, 205 (4th Dep't 1965).
48 401 US. 271 (1971), noted in 18 CATm. LAW. 67 (1972); 10 DUQUEsNE L. RIv. 123
(1971); 17 S.D.L. RV. 269 (1972).
1973]
